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GATT and GATS: A Public Morals
Attack on Money Laundering
Matthew B. Comstock*
INTRODUCTION
Experts estimate current worldwide profits from organized crime
at one trillion dollars.' By comparison, the aggregate profits of the
top fifty Fortune 500 companies totaled $33.923 billion in 1993.2 These
illegitimate profits derive from a new generation of international or-
ganized crime. Perhaps no one better symbolizes this new generation
of transnational gangster than the slain leader of the Medellin drug
cartel, Pablo Escobar. Mr. Escobar reaped hundreds of millions of
dollars from his illicit drug sales. He then "laundered" his ill-gotten
wealth in the world's major financial centers via phones, fax machines,
and computers located in his Colombian headquarters.
3
* Fulbright Fellow and LL.M. candidate at the Universitst Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany.
I would like to thank Professor Ronald Brand of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for
his help and encouragement in writing this article.
1 Michael Elliot, et al., The Global Mafia, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 22 (citing Roy J.
Godson of the National Strategy Information Center).
2 Joseph Pivinski, et al., The Fortune 500: The Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations, FoR-
TUNE, April 18, 1994, at 220. Those fifty companies are, in order from number one through
number fifty: General Motors, Ford Motor, Exxon, International Business Machines, General
Electric, Mobil, Philip Morris, Chrysler, Texaco, Du Pont, Chevron, Proctor & Gamble, Amoco,
Boeing, Pepsico, Conagra, Shell Oil, United Technologies, Hewlett-Packard, Eastman Kodak,
Dow Chemical, Atlantic Richfield, Motorola, USX, RJR Nabisco Holdings, Xerox, Sara Lee,
McDonnell Douglas, Digital Equipment, Johnson & Johnson, Minnesota Mining & Mfg, Coca-
Cola, International Paper, Tenneco, Lockheed, Georgia-Pacific, Phillips Petroleum, Alliedsignal,
IBP, Goodyear Tire, Caterpillar, Westinghouse Electric, Anheuser-Busch, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Rockwell International, Merck, Coastal, Archer Daniels Midland, Ashland Oil, and Weyerhaeu-
ser. Id.
3 Elliot, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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Money laundering4 empowers crime. Criminal activities such as
arms and drug trafficking generate large volumes of cash.5 However,
these large volumes of cash are quite unwieldy.6 For example, one
million dollars worth of twenty dollar bills weighs approximately one
hundred and ten pounds.' Moreover, in order to prevent detection
and apprehension, criminals require access to funds which appear to
be legitimate. 8 Enter money laundering. This process anchors suc-
cessful criminal operation because it facially legitimizes illegal
revenue.
Part I provides a general overview of money laundering and its
societal effects. Part II studies legislative responses of various nations
to money laundering issues, as well as international attempts to com-
bat it. Part III analyzes current international attempts to combat
money laundering utilizing a game theoretic model. The analysis con-
cludes that the attempts are less than effective. Game theory demon-
strates that an unscrupulous nation will always cheat absent a
disincentive to do so. Part IV advocates an international trade solu-
tion to what has historically been an international criminal issue. Spe-
cifically, Part IV posits that the Group of Seven industrialized nations
ought to impose tariffs on certain goods and services of nations which
refuse to criminalize money laundering. In the face of such tariffs,
little incentive exists to "cheat" on international agreements which
criminalize money laundering. Part V concludes the article.
I. MONEY LAUNDERING
A. Definition
"One goal of every criminal enterprise is to 'get away clean.' "9
Money laundering hides the trail of illegal profits and thus aids the
4 Money Laundering is "'the process whereby one conceals the existence, illegal source, or
illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.'"
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING iii (1984). Statement of Irving R. Kaufman, Chairman of the
President's Commission on Organized Crime [hereinafter REPORT].
5 Laura M.L. Maroldy, Recordkeeping and Reporting in an Attempt to Stop the Money
Laundering Cycle: Why Blanket Recording and Reporting of Electronic Funds Transfers is Not
the Answer, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 863, 865 (1991).
6 Id. at 866.
7 See Smith, infra note 29, at 126.
8 Maroldy, supra note 5, at 866.
9 Bradley 0. Field, Improving International Evidence-Gathering Methods: Piercing Bank




"getaway."'" As noted, money laundering is "'the process whereby
one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of
income and then disguises that income to make it appear legiti-
mate.' "I'
"Actual money laundering techniques can be very simple, such
as exchanging cash for cashier's checks, or very complex." 2 All
schemes, however, utilize the same general three step process. The
first step is termed "placement.' 3 Large sums of currency must be
deposited in seemingly legitimate bank accounts. Funds are either
commingled with legitimate business funds, or smuggled out of the
country and deposited with foreign banks.14 Drug dealers often en-
gage in a placement practice known as "smurfing."' The United
States' Bank Secrecy Act requires financial institutions to report
transactions involving sums greater than ten thousand dollars to the
Internal Revenue Service.' 6 "Smurfs," who are generally couriers for
drug dealers, make multiple deposits of less than ten thousand dollars
in a number of banks.17 Deposits are usually in the form of non-trace-
able financial instruments such as money orders or cashiers checks.'"
These kinds of structured transactions fail to initiate the reporting re-
quirements of banks.
The second step of the laundering process is known as "layer-
ing."' 9 Launderers aggregate the various placement accounts into
one, or possibly a few, large bank accounts.20 The criminal then elec-
tronically transfers funds from the main account to other financial in-
stitutions.2' The layering process creates multiple accounts in banks
10 Id.
I1 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
12 Maroldy, supra note 5, at 866.
13 Bruce Zagaris, Money Laundering: An International Control Problem, in INTERNATiONAL
HANDBOOK ON DRUG CONTROL 19 (Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, eds., 1992).
Zagaris formally defines placement as "the physical disposal of cash proceeds derived from ille-
gal activity." Id.
14 Gerard Wyrsch, Treasury Regulation of International Wire Transfer and Money Launder-
ing: A Case For A Permanent Moratorium, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 515, 516 (1992).
15 Id. at 523.
16 Amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act Titles I and III, Pub. L. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1114-1124 (1970) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act].
17 Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 523.
18 Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 523.
19 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 19. Zagaris formally defines layering as "the separation of the
illicit proceeds from their source by designing complex lawyers [sic - Freudian slip?] of financial
transactions designed to disguise the audit trail and to provide anonymity." Id.
20 Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 524.
21 Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 524.
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in numerous foreign countries. Consequently, the source of the funds
in any one account becomes difficult to trace.22
"Integration" comprises the third step of the laundering pro-
cess.23 The criminal enterprise injects "laundered" funds, funds which
seemingly emanate from legitimate bank accounts into the legitimate
economy.24 Real estate ranks as one of the favorite integration vehi-
cles of the money launderer.25 For example, a launderer purchases
property for two million dollars, an amount which represents its fair
market value. The new owner then sells the property. The launderer/
seller gives the buyer one million dollars. In turn, the buyer purchases
the property for three million - two million represents the fair market
value, but the other one million dollars is simply the return of the
money that the seller gave to the buyer.26 In this way, the launderer/
seller appears to legitimately make one million dollars in profit on the
real estate deal.27 The launderer/seller may then replace the "phan-
tom" profit with one million dollars of criminal proceeds.
B. The Money Laundering Process
This section provides a brief overview of the three step money
laundering process. The system described follows a typical drug pro-
ceeds laundering process.
The first step is placement of the illicit drug proceeds.28 During
this portion of the process, couriers gather the revenue from "street
sales," which are in the form of small denomination currency, and ex-
22 Maroldy writes:
Launderers often use financial institutions that have their headquarters or branches in for-
eign jurisdictions. They choose particular foreign jurisdictions on the basis of their bank
secrecy laws. These laws typically favor the privacy of the account owner over the law
enforcement interest of other sovereignties that try to obtain access to banking records. The
convenience of "offshore" banking is enhanced by the fact that many jurisdictions allow
funds to be held in the currency of the deposit-holder's choice.
Maroldy, supra note 5, at 867 n.12.
23 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 20. Zagaris formally defines integration as follows:
[Integration is] the provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally derived wealth. If the
layering process has succeeded, integration mechanisms place the laundered proceeds back
into the economy so that they reenter the financial system appearing to be normal business
funds.
Zagaris, supra note 13, at 20.
24 Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 524.
25 BARBARA WEBSTER AND MICHAEL S. MCCAMPBELL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING: RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION JOIN FORCES 6 (1992).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 19.
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change these small bills for larger denomination currency.2 9 In street
parlance, this exchange, as noted, is known as "smurfing."30 "The
'smurf' changes the small denomination bills into large denomination
bills, cashier's checks, or money orders by repetitively visiting bank
after bank with amounts insufficient to arouse suspicion."
31
During the placement3 2 phase, launderers transport the "placed"
drug profits to a jurisdiction which permits, explicitly or implicitly,
money laundering.3 Criminals either physically transport the cash to
the jurisdiction via courier, or establish a "shell" corporation (a ficti-
tious corporation established solely as vessel for illicit proceeds).3
Drug traffickers deposit their revenue in the account(s) of the shell
corporation(s) and then electronically transfer money from those ac-
counts to accounts in money haven jurisdictions (those with strong
bank secrecy laws).
With profits safely "laundered" in money haven bank accounts,
drug traffickers freely engage in the final phase of the laundering pro-
cess, integration. 6 Often, the criminals transfer funds from these safe
accounts to other accounts around the world, or make "loans" from
29 Geoffrey W. Smith, Competition in the European Financial Services Industry: The Free
Movement of Capital Versus the Regulation of Money Laundering, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 101,
110 (1992).
"The advantage of consolidating the small bills received in street transactions into larger
denominations can be seen by comparing the value of a given weight of bills: 1 pound of
$20 bills equals $9,080, 1 pound of $100 bills equals $45,400; 100 pounds of $20 bills equals
$908,000, 100 pounds of $100 bills equals $4,540,000." Id. at 126 n.91.
See also Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, HEARNGS BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SUBCO/MM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AF-
FAIRS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 181, at 312 (1983).
30 Smith, supra note 29, at 126-27.
31 Smith, supra note 29, at 127.
32 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 19.
33 Smith, supra note 29, at 126-27. Bank secrecy laws play an essential role in money laun-
dering. For example, the Swiss Civil Code forbids banks, attorneys and notaries from disclosing
information about the holders of Swiss bank accounts to third parties. Because money in such
accounts is essentially immune from criminal investigation, Swiss banks, among others provide
ideal havens for illicit profits. Rebecca G. Peters, Money Laundering and Its Current Status in
Switzerland: New Disincentives For Financial Tourism, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 104, 109
(1990). See also Swiss Civil Code (Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch vom 10. Dezember 1907),
arts. 27 & 28.
34 Smith, supra note 29, at 124-25.
35 Smith, supra note 29, at 124-25. Three systems, the Federal Reserve Communications
System (Fedwire), the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), and the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), engage in daily electronic funds
transaction in excess of $1.2 trillion dollars. Such systems provide ideal mechanisms for illegal
profits transfers. Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 518.
36 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 20.
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shell corporations to legitimate business enterprises.37 Launderers
also favor real estate purchases, as described in the previous section.38
Thus the money laundering process crosses many borders. Con-
sequently, efforts to track any particular laundering scheme require
the cooperation of law enforcement officials in multiple countries. Ju-
risdictional issues greatly hamper any investigation. Moreover, even
the laws of cooperative countries differ on definitions of money laun-
dering, appropriate penalties, and proper investigative procedures.
C. Societal Consequences of Money Laundering
The mechanism of money laundering permits profitable criminal
activity. "Without laundering, the risk/reward ratio for the underlying
crime is unattractive.... Efficient laundering renders the underlying
crime lucrative, and therefore perpetuates it."'39 Thus money launder-
ing represents the keystone to successful organized crime.
Legitimizing illegal profits also poses a threat to the licit econ-
omy. First, as noted previously, organized criminals view real estate
as the injection method of choice.4" In the real estate example given,
the buyer paid three million dollars for property with a fair market
value of two million dollars.4 ' Such a scheme effectively "legitimizes"
criminal profits by making them appear to be real estate profits; how-
ever, the scheme also inflates local real estate values.42 Banks ap-
prove loans which utilize inflated property as collateral. Often,
borrowers purchase additional real estate, given that the market ap-
pears to be lucrative. In economic terms, an inflated market such as
this is known as a "speculative bubble." Speculative bubbles inevita-
bly burst. Money laundering, therefore, may lead to a real estate mar-
ket crash.
Second, use of legitimate financial institutions to "wash" illicit
profits threatens the integrity of the entire system. "The fear of finan-
cial regulators is that when credit and financial institutions are used to
launder proceeds from criminal activities... the soundness and stabil-
ity of the [particular] institution concerned and confidence in the fi-
nancial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardized."43 When a
37 Smith, supra note 29, at 127.
38 Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 522.
39 Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime
of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REv. 287, 291 (1989).
40 WEBSTER AND MCCAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 6.
41 WEBSTER AND MCCAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 6.
42 WEBSTER AND MCCAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 6.
43 Smith, supra note 29, at 111.
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legitimate financial institution launders illegal profits, knowingly or
not, that institution supports illegal drug trafficking, prostitution, and
illegal arms sales throughout the world.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO MONEY LAUNDERING
The following passages outline the anti-laundering initiatives of
the United States, the European Community, and the international
community to date.
A. The United States
The watershed money laundering statute of the United States is
the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)." The BSA primarily requires financial
institutions to collect and report data.45
The BSA requires financial institutions to file the Currency
Transaction Report (CTR) and the Report of International Transpor-
tation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR) with the Treas-
ury Department.46 Financial institutions must file these reports when
customers engage in transactions of ten thousand dollars or more.47
CTRs apply to domestic transactions, and CMIRs to transnational
transactions in which persons transport currency or financial instru-
ments of any kind into or out of the United States. 48 These provi-
sions apply only to domestic financial institutions and foreign financial
institutions which conduct business in the United States (that is,
United States branches of foreign banks).4 9
Despite enactment of the BSA, federal law failed to criminalize
money laundering until 1986. In that year, Congress enacted the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ('86 Act).50 The '86 Act not only criminal-
44 Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 16.
45 Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 16. Law enforcement officials within the United States
Custom Service, Internal Revenue Service, Office of Financial Enforcement, the Department of
Justice and the Office of Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FINCEN) are the primary
consumers of data gathered as a result of BSA data compilation requirements. Wyrsch, supra
note 14, at 525.
46 Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 16, at 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988).
47 Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 16, at 31 U.S.C. § 5316.
48 Vyrsch, supra note 14, at 526.
49 Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 527. The BSA requires financial institutions to provide the
identification and occupation of any individual who engages in a transaction of ten thousand
dollars or more, the identification of the individual or entity on whose behalf the transaction was
conducted, the account number involved in the transaction, and a description of the transaction.
Wyrsch, supra note 14, at 527.
50 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 100 Stat. 3207,
3218-39 [hereinafter '86 Act]. Various portions of the '86 Act are codified at 12 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C..
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izes money laundering but also prohibits structured transactions which
avoid the ten thousand dollars limit (that is, "smurfing").5 1 Addition-
ally, the '86 Act requires economic sanctions against foreign nations
which support laundering.52
Congress next enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 ('88
Act).53 The '88 Act enhances United States efforts against money
laundering in several important aspects. First, in an effort to combat
smurfing, the '88 Act forbids financial institutions to sell cashier's
checks, money orders, bank checks, or traveler's checks in amounts
greater than three thousand dollars unless the purchaser meets certain
criteria.54 The purchaser of such a monetary instrument must (1) have
an account with the financial institution and (a) establish that fact via
a signature card or (b) by other means of identification which the De-
partment of Treasury may establish, or (2) establish identity to the
financial institution by other means which the Secretary of Treasury
may prescribe.55 Second, the '88 Act permits the Department of
Treasury to impose additional recordkeeping requirements for cur-
rency transactions which exceed an amount set by the Department of
Treasury.56 Third, financial institutions may "provide the financial
records of any major borrower, officer, director, employee, or control-
ling shareholder of such institution whenever there is reason to be-
lieve that the records are relevant to show possible criminal activity by
such individuals against the institution... .,57 Fourth, the '88 Act re-
quires the Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate an international cur-
rency control agency with foreign finance ministers.58 Finally, the '88
Act requires the Secretary to request that foreign countries keep
records of large United States currency transactions taking place
within their borders.59
Both the '86 and '88 Acts impose civil and criminal liability for
violations by financial institutions and would be money launderers.
Civil penalties include fines of up to one hundred thousand dollars, or
the amount involved in the transaction in the case of a single viola-
51 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. V 1987). Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International En-
forcement of Money Movement and Related Matters - A United States Perspective, 22 GEO.
WASH J. INT'L L. & ECON. 465, 469 n.17 (1989).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. V 1987).
53 Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
54 Zagaris, supra note 51, at 471.
55 Zagaris, supra note 51, at 471.
56 Zagaris, supra note 51, at 472.
57 Zagaris, supra note 51, at 473.




tion.6 ° In the case of willful violations, the legislation imposes crimi-
nal penalties of five hundred thousand dollars in fines and/or ten years
in61in prison.
United States money laundering laws rank among the strictest in
the world. However, capital follows the path of least resistance. Con-
sequently, illicit profits inevitably flow out of the United States to
money havens. Without similar legislation in other states, or laws
which are at least similar in effect, the United States laundering re-
gime has only minor impact.
B. The European Community
As of July 1, 1990 capital movements throughout the European
Union are fully liberalized.6 a The Capital Movements Directive
(CMD) abolishes foreign exchange restrictions and removes "all ob-
stacles to the execution of the capital transactions themselves. 63 "In
short, the Directive gives financial service firms free access to the fi-
nancial system of any Member State whether this access be in the
form of a multi-billion [European Currency Unit] bond or a simple
checking account." 64 The CMD is mandatory; that is, Member States
must remove obstacles to the free flow capital among European
Union Member States.65 Europe's financial system, therefore, ap-
pears to facilitate money laundering schemes.
In 1990, however, the European Union proposed legislation
which requests Member States to criminalize money laundering.66
Article 2 of the Money Laundering Proposal specifically requires
Member States to prohibit money laundering.
67
Article 3 is the "Know-your-customer" provision. This provision
requires financial institutions to identify customers through support-
ing evidence where the amount of the transaction equals or exceeds
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Directive of 24 June 1988 For The Implementation of Article 67 of The Treaty, Council
Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5 [hereinafter Capital Movements Directive].
63 Captial Movements Directive, supra note 62.
64 Smith, supra note 29, at 103.
65 Capital Movements Directive, supra note 62.
66 Proposal for a Council Directive on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering, 90/C 1990 O.J. (C 106) 6 [hereinafter Money Laundering
Proposal].
67 Id. France, Italy, Luxembourg & the U.K. have criminalized money laundering; Belgium
and Germany are considering such laws; and Spain and the Netherlands have adopted no legisla-
tion. Smith, supra note 29, at 111.
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ECU 15,000.68 Future compliance of Member States with the Money
Laundering Proposal, as well as the affects of the Money Laundering
Proposal on the CMD remain uncertain.
C. International Efforts
Nations now recognize that efforts to combat money laundering
require international cooperation. The following section examines in-
ternational efforts to date.
1. The Drug Convention
The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Drug Convention)69 represents
the watershed international money laundering agreement. Con-
tracting parties to the Drug Convention agree to criminalize money
laundering and cooperate on international law enforcement issues.70
In addition, contracting states may obtain evidence from other con-
tracting parties to be used for arrest and prosecution of money laun-
derers under the Drug Convention.7 Article 6 of the convention
provides for extradition of launderers,72 and Article 5 provides for for-
feiture of assets.73 In fact, "each party is obligated to adopt national
measures necessary to empower domestic authorities to confiscate
drug proceeds and property purchased with drug proceeds. '7
4
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the Drug Convention
defines several key offenses.75 First, it defines drug trafficking of-
fenses.76 Second, the Drug Convention establishes money laundering
and aiding and abetting money laundering as crimes.77 Consequently,
68 Money Laundering Proposal, supra note 66, art. 3. The provision also requires financial
institutions to report transactions below the ECU 15,000 level if they appear suspicious. Id. art.
4.
69 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20,
1989, UN Doe. E/CONF.82/15, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter Drug Convention].
70 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 32. More than one hundred countries are contracting parties to
the Drug Convention, which went into effect on November 1, 1990. Id.
The "ratifying nations are required to implement legislation and administrative measures to
monitor and enforce the provisions of the [Drug] Convention." Scott E. Mortman, Putting Starch
in European Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, 60 FoiRAM L. REV. 429, 440 n.85 (1992).
71 Drug Convention, supra note 69, art. 7.
72 Drug Convention, supra note 69, at 507.
73 Drug Convention, supra note 69, at 504.
74 Mortman, supra note 70, 440.
75 Zagaris, supra note 24, at 32.
76 Zagaris, supra note 24, at 32.
77 Zagaris, supra note 24, at 32.
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the Drug Convention represents the most comprehensive interna-
tional agreement to combat money laundering to date.
2. The Basle Statement
The Basle Supervisory Committee s has formulated a five-part
plan which establishes "an ethical code of conduct for central bank
supervisors to implement [in regard to prevention of money launder-
ing] and monitor. ' 79 The Committee believes that Banks must pre-
vent their institutions from associating with criminal activity to ensure
the integrity of the banking system."0 "The [S]tatement encourages
banks to know their customers, to spot suspicious transactions, and to
cooperate fully with law enforcement authorities." 81 In addition, if
financial institutions reasonably believe deposits or financial transac-
tions to be of criminal origin, the Basle Statement encourages these
institutions to take legal action."
Although the Basle Statement lacks binding legal effect, banks
often voluntarily implement its tenets.8 3  Thus, the organizations
which serve as conduits for money laundering attempt to combat the
problem through the Basle Statement.
3. G-7 Task Force Report
The Group of Seven Industrialized Nations84 (G-7) recognizes
"the threat of money laundering to the world's banking and financial
system. '8 5 The G-7's Financial Action Task Force8 6 (Task Force) com-
78 The heads of the central banks of the world's industrialized nations comprise the Basle
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. Zagaris, supra note 13, at 35.
The nations of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, the United States, Luxembourg, and Sweden comprised the Committee.
Mortman, supra note 70, at 433 n.71 (citing TRENDS AND FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
LAW 113-117 (W. Park ed., 1990)).
79 Lowell Quillen, The International Attack on Money Laundering: European Initiatives,
1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 213, 217 (1991).
80 Mortman, supra note 70, at 440.
81 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 37. "For example, banks should deny assistance, sever relations
with the customer, and close or freeze accounts in connection with suspicious activity. It also
provides specific means to ensure implementation of the measures." Id.
82 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 37.
83 Quillen, supra note 79, at 225 n.24.
84 John W. Head, Suspension of Debtor Countries' Voting Rights in the IMF: An Assessement
of the Third Amendment to the IMF Charter, 33 VA. J. IN'L L. 591, 637 n.207 (1993). Bruce
Zagaris & Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture International and Foreign Law: An Emerging Re-
gime, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 445, 460 n. 63 (1991).
85 Quillen, supra note 79, at 217-18.
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piled significant research and put forth "forty recommendations di-
rected at stopping money laundering.""7
The Task Force recommends 1) that national legislatures
criminalize money laundering;88 2) that legislatures hold "corpora-
tions and their employees criminally liable for money-laundering ac-
tivities; '8 9 and 3) calls upon financial institutions to "improve their
monitoring systems for cash transactions and report all suspected
drug-related transactions." 9°
These recommendations (G-7 Task Force Report) lack binding
legal effect but seek to influence the legislatures of the international
community.
4. European Community Council Directive
European Community Council Directive 91/30891 (Directive),
like most other money laundering efforts to date, requires members of
the European Union to criminalize money laundering.92 The Directive
likewise requires members to cooperate in the investigation and pros-
ecution of launderers (the Directive is the successor to the Money
Laundering Proposal noted in Part II). 3
The Directive obligates European Union financial institutions as
well. Transactions in excess of $18,500 require the institution to pro-
cure proper identification from the customer.94 Where a transaction
falls below $18,500, financial institutions may request identification if
the transaction appears to be suspicious.95 Where the customer acts
86 "The FATF [Task Force] was created in July 1989 at the Economic Summit of Industrial-
ized Countries in Paris in an effort to develop an international approach to controlling money
laundering." Mortman, supra note 70, at 436.
87 Quillen, supra note 79, at 218 (citing Task Force Report).
88 Mortman, supra note 70, at 437.
89 Mortman, supra note 70, at 437.
90 Mortman, supra note 70, at 437.
91 Council Directive 91/308, 1991 OJ. (L 166) 77.
92 The Directive defines money laundering "as intentional conversion or transfer of property
while knowing that the property is derived from criminal activity 'for the purpose of concealing
or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the
commission of such to evade the legal consequences of his action.'" Zagaris, supra note 13, at
38.
93 Mortman, supra note 70, at 431. "The directive prohibits money laundering of funds de-
rived from drug trafficking and other criminal offenses ...." Zagaris, supra note 13, at 37.
94 Mortman, supra note 70, at 433.
95 Mortman, supra note 70, at 434.
In addition, financial institutions are "required to examine carefully any transaction which,
by its nature, they believe is likely to involve money laundering. Institutions in member
states are required to inform the appropriate authorities of any suspected money-laundering





on behalf of another party, the institution must take steps to obtain
the identification of that other party.96 The Directive presents the
most comprehensive attempt by the European Union to deal with
money laundering to date.
5. Draft Convention of Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (European
Convention)
The twenty-three members of the Council of Europe97 have ne-
gotiated the European Convention. 98 The European Convention aims
to facilitate international cooperation in money laundering and asset
forfeiture.99 It specifically requests contracting parties to enact forfei-
ture legislation, as well as legislation to pierce bank secrecy.' 0 The
Drug Convention serves as the basis for the European Convention;
however, the European Convention permits criminalization of money
laundering related to non-drug offenses.'
Because the Council represents a greater number of European
nations, its impact is likely to be greater than that of the proposed
Money Laundering Directive of the European Union. Moreover, the
European Convention permits the Council to propose criminal laws
"and recognizes the need to pursue a common criminal policy in this
[money laundering] area."' 0 2 The Council also believes that the for-
mer Soviet states will soon join the Council of Europe. 0 3 The Council
Mortman, supra note 70, at 434.
96 Mortman, supra note 70, at 434.
97 The Council of Europe formed on May 5, 1949. The Council (which includes both Euro-
pean Union and non-European Union and non-European Union members) strives to achieve
unity on a variety of European economic and social issues through "agreements and common
action." J.A. Andrews, The European Jurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REv. 463,464
(citing Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 1(a)-(b), reprinted in MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE at 299, app. 1 (1970)).
98 ILM 148 (1991). The European Convention will enter into force three months after three
states have ratified. The European Convention was opened for signature on November 8, 1990
in Strasbourg, France. Mortman, supra note 70, at 432.
Currently, fifteen nations are contracting parties to the European Convention, including
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Mortman, supra note 70, at
437.
99 Mortman, supra note 70, at 432.
100 Mortman, supra note 70, at 432.
101 Zagaris, supra note 13, at 36.
102 Quillen, supra note 79, at 220.
103 Quillen, supra note 79, at 220.
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thereby hopes to lessen the flood of illegal money into those states,
which generally lack criminal money laundering laws.
1' 4
Each of the above agreements represents a significant step in rid-
ding the world financial system of money laundering. Although many
states currently criminalize the washing of illegal profits, many others
do not. Those states which choose not to criminalize such use of the
world's financial system hope to gain economic value from their
stance. The most appropriate way to remove the incentive to permit
money laundering is to remove its potential economic value. The re-
mainder of this article proposes an economic solution to an economic
problem.
IIl. A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
A. The Prisoner's Dilemma
This article has presented a basic outline of what money launder-
ing is, why it poses a threat to the world economy, and how states
combat it. Unfortunately, not all nations choose to become con-
tracting parties to anti-money laundering efforts, or to fulfill their ob-
ligations pursuant to such efforts. Moreover, no agreement will
entice unscrupulous nations to comply with money laundering agree-
ments. Game theory explains why current initiatives ineffectively
combat money laundering.
Game theory 0 5 in general exhibits the following characteristics:
1) The game is usually played within a 2 X 2 payoff matrix (the
matrix illustrates the outcome which results from the players'
choices).
2) Player 1, in the examples that follow, plays the rows: the
"play" is the choice between the top or bottom row.
3) Player 2 plays the columns, and chooses between the left or
the right column.
4) Each of the numbered squares represents a combination of
choices.
5) The combination which results from the choices determines
the payoff to the players.106
104 Quillen, supra note 79, at 220.
105 Game theory analyzes strategic interaction. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICRO-
ECONOMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH 466 (1987). Examples best illustrate the functioning of
game theory.
106 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nations Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of Interna-
tional Trade, 26 HARV. IN'L L.J. 501, 504-05 (1985). See also Varian, supra note 105, at 466.
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The classic example of game theory is the prisoner's dilemma.10 7
In this example, the police incarcerate two persons involved in a crime
but place each person in a separate room.108 As a result of their sepa-
ration, the prisoners cannot communicate with each other. Conse-
quently, each person must decide on his or her own what strategy will
result in an optimal outcome - that is, what statements to the police
will result in the most lenient punishment.
Each of the prisoners may deny the crime or confess to the
crime.'0 9 The police attempt to extract a confession from one of the
prisoners. If one prisoner confesses but the other denies, the confes-
sor will be set free (Diagram 1 - a payoff matrix - represents freedom
by "0," which signifies no prison term). The other prisoner, however
will receive the maximum sentence because confession necessarily im-
plicates the other prisoner ("-7" in Diagram 1, which indicates a seven
year prison term ).110
Refer to Diagram 1. If Player 1 (prisoner 1) confesses, he or she
is set free. Player 2 (prisoner 2), however, receives the maximum sen-
tence of seven years, assuming he or she denies the crime. Box 2 of
the diagram demonstrates this scenario. Box 3 shows the same result,
only Player 2 confesses and Player 1 denies the crime."'
If both Players confess, both receive a five year prison sentence,
as Box 4 demonstrates. If both players deny the crime, both players
will receive one year sentences." 2 Box 1 represents this outcome.
For each individual player, confession provides the most advanta-
geous choice, regardless of the choice of the other player." 3 Take, for
example, the situation which confronts Player 1. If Player 2 chooses
to deny the crime, Player 1 ought to confess. Player 1 will go free in
that situation (Box 2)."1 Likewise, if Player 2 confesses, Player 1
ought to confess. If Player 1 confesses, she receives a five year prison
sentence rather than the seven year prison sentence she would receive
for a denial, given Player 2's confession." 5 Consequently, confession
provides the "dominant strategy" for each player. 16 A dominant
107 Varian, supra note 105, at 470.
108 Varian, supra note 105, at 470.
109 Varian, supra note 105, at 470.
110 Varian, supra note 105, at 470-71.
111 Varian, supra note 105, at 470.
112 Varian, supra note 105, at 471.
113 Varian, supra note 105, at 471. See also Abbott, supra note 105, at 506.
114 Varian, supra note 105, at 471.
115 Varian, supra note 105, at 470.
116 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.
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strategy arises where one optimal choice exists for each player in-
dependent of the other player's choice.
117
The dominant strategy of confession creates the prisoner's di-
lemma. Each player is likely to choose confession. The payoff which
results is Box 4 of Diagram 1. Both players receive a five year sen-
tence. Both prisoners, therefore, are worse off as a result of following
the dominant strategy, which is the likely scenario.
The amount by which a player may improve his or her predica-
ment by confession is termed the "temptation differential.""' 8 The
higher the differential, the more likely the player to confess. 119 In the
case at hand, the temptation differential for confession is seven years
if the other player denies, and two years if the other player confesses.
Thus a strong temptation to confess exists. The best strategy, the one
which improves the position of both players, is denial on the part both
players.120 A strategy which improves the lot of both players is Pareto
efficient. A "situation is PARETO EFFICIENT if there is no way to make
any person better off without hurting anybody else [emphasis in origi-
nal]."'121 In other words, if both players deny the crime, the aggregate
prison time for the two players is two years. For one denial and one
confession, the aggregate prison time is seven years. For two confes-
sions, aggregate prison time is ten years (see Diagram 1 for payoffs).
Acquiescence to the dominant strategy, therefore, is the worst possi-
ble (Pareto inefficient) strategy for both players.
117 Varian, supra note 105, at 467.
118 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.
119 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.
120 Although confession may lead to freedom for one player if the other denies the crime,
denial is the only strategy which improves the plight of both players.














In summary, three relationships develop from the prisoner's di-
lemma diagram:
1) Confession is the dominant strategy for each player, regardless
of what choice the other player makes.
2) For each player, the higher payoff results if the other player
chooses denial.
3) The Pareto efficient strategy occurs when both players deny
the crime. If both confess, the worst payoff results.
122
B. International Trade and the Prisoner's Dilemma
The prisoner's dilemma adapts well to the realm of international
trade. In the case of international trade, the players choose between
cooperation (remaining open to free trade) and denial (granting pro-
tection to certain industries).23
Refer to Diagram 2. "B" represents the optimal outcome, "S"
the second best outcome, "T" the third best outcome, and "W" the
worst outcome for any individual player.'2 4 The individual players are
trading nations which may or may not decide that free trade is in the
best interests of national welfare.
Box 2 demonstrates that if Player 1 protects its domestic indus-
tries and Player 2 cooperates (remains open to free trade), the result is
the optimal outcome for Player 1 but the worst outcome for Player
2.11 Box 3 illustrates essentially the same outcome, except that
122 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.
123 Abbott, supra note 106, at 505.
124 Abbott, supra note 106, at 505.
125 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.
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Player 2 attains optimal results, while Player 1 receives the worst
outcome.
126
Denial is the dominant strategy for each player.127 For example,
if Player 2 chooses cooperation, Player 1 ought to choose denial. That
choice, as Box 2 illustrates, leaves Player 1 with the optimal outcome.
Likewise, should Player 2 choose denial, Player 1 ought to choose de-
nial as well. Denial leaves Player 1 with the third best outcome (see
Box 4), whereas cooperation would leave Player 1 with the worst out-
come (see Box 3).128
The situation is analogous to the prisoner's dilemma. The domi-
nant strategy for each player is denial. However, cooperation pro-
vides the Pareto efficient strategy. In other words, cooperation
improves the situation of both players (see Box 1).129 Cooperation
results in the second best outcome for both players. Thus cooperation
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126 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.
127 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.
128 Abbott, supra note 106, at 506.





why cooperation, that is, free trade, rep-




David Ricardo posited the classic theory of free trade known as
comparative advantage. 130 "A country has comparative advantage in
a good if the product has a lower pretrade relative price than is found
elsewhere in the world.' 131 To state the law in clearer terms, a coun-
try ought to specialize in that good which it can produce more effi-
ciently than any other good.
The law of comparative advantage actually derives from the law
of absolute advantage promulgated in the eighteenth century by
Adam Smith.'32 A country maintains absolute advantage in a good
where it "produce[s] a good using fewer production inputs than is pos-
sible anywhere else in the world."'1 33 According to Smith, the most
efficient global division of labor occurs when trading nations special-
ize in the production of those goods in which the nations maintain
absolute advantage. The following tables illustrate absolute
advantage.
TABLE 1
WORLD TRADE BASED ON ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE 1 3 4
Country
A B
Soybeans (S) 3 12
Textiles (T) 6 4
* The numbers listed in the table represent labor hours necessary to produce one unit of S or T.
Country A possesses absolute advantage in the production of S
(three labor hours per unit as opposed to twelve in Country B).
Country B, on the other hand, possesses absolute advantage in the
production of T (four hours per unit as opposed to six in Country A).
Absolute advantage dictates that Country A specialize in the produc-
tion of S, and that Country B specialize in the production of T.135
If Country A reduces output of T by one unit, the reduction frees
six hours of labor.136 Assuming that T labor easily moves to the pro-
130 STEVEN HUSTED AND MICHAEL MELVIN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 68 (1990). For an
interesting narrative on the life and work of David Ricardo, see TODD G. BUCHHOLZ, NEW
IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMIsTs: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 62
(1989).
131 Id.
132 Husted, supra note 130, at 65. For an interesting narrative on the life and work of Adam
Smith, see Buchholz, supra note 130, at 10.
133 Husted, supra note 130, at 65.
134 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
135 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
136 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
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duction of S, S producers utilize these six hours to produce two addi-
tional units of S. 137 If Country B reduces S production by one unit,
the reduction frees twelve hours of labor.138 T producers utilize these
twelve hours of labor to produce three additional units of T.
139
Let P, equal the price of S, PT equal the price of T, WA equal the
wages paid to labor in country A, and WB equal the wages paid to
labor in Country B. The following equations calculate the price of S
relative to T in each of the countries:
PJPT in A = (WA X 3)/(WA X 6) = 3/6 = 1/2
PJPT in B = (WB X 12)/(WB X 4) = 12/4 = 3140
In autarky,141 S costs one-half unit of T in Country A, but three units
of T in Country B. If the two countries agree to free trade, Country
B's consumers will purchase soybeans from Country A rather than
from domestic producers. 42
Under this condition of free trade, world (for purposes of this
example, Countries A and B comprise the "world") production of S
increases one unit. World production of T rises two units. Note that
specialization and free trade accomplish this worldwide increase in
output of both products without any increase in inputs. 43
TABLE 2
PER UNIT GAINS FROM SPECIALIZATION'"
Per Unit Gain
In Production of S In Production of T
In A +2 -1
In B -1 +3
In World +1 +2
What if one country possesses absolute advantage in both goods?
Comparative advantage governs this situation. A country should spe-
cialize in that good in which it attains the greatest absolute advantage
(if the country in question has absolute advantage in both goods), or
137 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
138 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
139 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
140 Husted, supra note 130, at 67.
141 Autarky refers to the absence of international trade.
142 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
143 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
144 Husted, supra note 130, at 66.
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in that good where it maintains the least absolute disadvantage (if the
country in question lacks absolute advantage in either good).145
TABLE 3




Soybeans (S) 3 12
Textiles (T) 6 8
* The numbers listed in the table denote the number of labor hours required to produce one unit
of the relevant good.
A produces S consuming one fourth of the inputs B requires and
produces T using three fourths of the inputs B requires. Conse-
quently, A retains absolute advantage in both goods. However, the
table shows that A is four times more efficient in the production of S
as compared to B but only four thirds more efficient in the production
of T as compared to B. 147 Thus, Country A ought to produce S be-
cause A's greatest absolute advantage lies in the production of S.
That is, A possesses comparative advantage in S production. 48 Coun-
try B ought to produce T, the good in which it possesses least absolute
disadvantage. B holds comparative advantage in T production. 49
If Countries A and B function under a free trade regime, each
should move to specialize in the production of its comparative advan-
tage good.'50 Each country would export excess production of its
comparative advantage good in return for the excess of the other
country's comparative advantage good.' 51
145 Husted, supra note 130, at 68.
146 Husted, supra note 130, at 68.
147 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
148 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
149 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
150 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
151 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
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TABLE 4
PER UNIT GAINS FROM SPECIALIZATION
15 2
Per Unit Gains
In Production of S In Production of T
In A +2 -1
In B -1 +1.5
In World +1 +0.5
If A reduces T production by one unit, the reduction frees six
hours of labor. With these six hours, A produces two additional units
of S ( which requires three hours of labor per unit). 53 If B reduces S
production by one unit, the reduction frees twelve labor hours. With
these twelve hours, B produces one and one-half additional units of T
(which requires eight hours of labor per unit).'
54
Free trade therefore increases the welfare of both nations relative
to autarky' 55  Moreover, welfare increases without additional in-
puts.' 56 Free trade increases efficiency.
Return to the prisoner's dilemma and its application to interna-
tional trade. Given the law of comparative advantage, which requires
specialization and free trade, the choice of cooperation by each player
clearly leads to the Pareto efficient outcome. Free trade increases the
welfare of both players.'57 International trade laws ensure that con-
152 Husted, supra note 130, at 66. The per unit gains which this table illustrates result from the
law of comparative advantage.
153 Husted, supra note 130. at 69.
154 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
155 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
156 Husted, supra note 130, at 69.
157 If free trade increases global economic welfare without additional resources, the reader
might logically ask why the outcome of Box 1 in Diagram 2 is not "B,B" rather than "S,S."
Public choice theories suggest that the answer is more political than economic. Government
leaders realize that free trade negatively impacts the inefficient segments of the national econ-
omy (the impacts are negative only to those who participate in the inefficient industries). Thus
the government attempts to balance between long term interests of national economic welfare
and the interests of those who bear the brunt of free trade. This maximizes the government
officials' chances of reelection; unfortunately, the consumer pays the price of protection. Ab-
bott, supra note 106, at 510.
Some economic theories also explain Diagram 2. One theory, known as the optimal tariff,
holds that a large country which is the sole consumer (has monopsony power) of "a product can
improve its welfare, at the expense of a greater reduction in world welfare, by taxing imports of
that product (defecting) up to some optimal level." Abbott, supra note 106, at 508. The export-
ing nations will cut prices in order to retain market share. Thus the consumers of the monop-
sony nation suffer no price increases in the product.
Another popular theory is the infant industry argument. This theory asserts that a domestic
industry which is not currently viable will become competitive if the government will protect it




tracting parties to free trade agreements follow the path of compara-
tive advantage to Pareto efficient outcomes. 58
C. Money Laundering and the Prisoner's Dilemma
The prisoner's dilemma also arises in the context of international
money laundering agreements, with one modification. In the interna-
tional agreements context, the contracting parties are able to commu-
nicate with each other.
Refer to Diagram 3. This diagram utilizes the same outcomes as
the international trade diagram. The dominant strategy once again
creates a dilemma. In this case, the dominant strategy for each player
(nation) is denial (legalization/tolerance of money laundering by the
nation's financial institutions). For example, if Player 2 chooses coop-
eration (criminalization of money laundering), the optimal choice for
Player 1 is denial. Box 2 shows the outcome of this choice (the net
result is that Player l's financial institutions realize all of the profits
from money laundering, which leaves Player 2 to bear a greater por-
tion of the costs of fighting international criminal activity).' 5 9 Like-
wise, if Player 2 chooses denial, denial represents the optimal choice
for Player 1. If Player I were to choose to cooperate, Player 2's finan-
cial institutions would gain the profits from money laundering, while
Player 1 would bear the burden of combating money laundering.
Thus, whatever option Player 2 chooses, Player 1 ought to choose de-
nial. The same analysis applies to Player 2's choice. Its dominant
strategy, regardless of what choice Player 1 makes, is denial. How-
short run costs are more than outweighed by the long term benefits that this infant industry will
bring in the form of jobs. Abbott, supra note 106, at 511.
Both arguments possess considerable shortcomings. The optimal tariff inevitably invites re-
taliation on other products, and therefore poses the danger of a trade war. In the case of the
second theory, infant industries often remain protected long after maturity. Moreover, protec-
tion of infant industries diverts resources from existing viable industries. Government saves
infant industries at the cost of presently viable industries.
Given, however, that government falls prey to public choice considerations and protection-
ist economic theories, Diagram 2 most accurately reflects the prisoner's dilemma as it applies to
international trade.
158 Abbott, supra note 106, at 522. International trade law aids public officials in making the
choice for free trade, which raises world economic welfare. First, a public official must obey the
law, trade law, rather than grant protection. Second, public officials can blame international
trade laws for adverse effects on constituents rather than shoulder the blame personally. Ab-
bott, supra note 106, at 522.
159 As noted previously, the money laundering process crosses many borders. Therefore,
combating money laundering, which renders the underlying crime profitable, requires the coop-
eration of a multitude of nations. Moreover, fighting money laundering serves the mutual best
interests of nations in that it protects the licit national economies of those nations. WEBSTER
AND MCCAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 6.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 15:139 (1994)
ever, if both players choose denial, the Pareto inefficient outcome re-
suits. Neither player's financial institutions profits as greatly as they
would have had the other player cooperated. Moreover, the nations'
policies towards money laundering drive the underlying criminal ac-
tivity, which damages the licit economies of the nations. 6 °
Cooperation on the part of both players produces the Pareto effi-
cient outcome, as Diagram 3 demonstrates. A concerted effort to
combat money laundering inhibits profitability of the underlying crim-
inal activity. Such cooperation also relieves domestic economies of
the threat which money laundering poses to the licit economy.
International cooperative efforts endeavor to reach the Pareto ef-
ficient outcomes. As noted above, agreements (which are possible be-
cause the nations of the world are able to communicate, unlike the
prisoners) such as the Drug Convention require contracting parties to
criminalize money laundering. For the reasons that follow, however,
these cooperative efforts fail.
Refer again to Diagram 3. Contracting parties to an international
agreement place themselves in Box 1, the Pareto efficient outcome.
However, a nation may choose not to become a contracting party to
such an agreement, or may choose to revoke its consent to be bound
by such an agreement. 161 In addition, this unscrupulous nation knows
with near certainty that many other nations will continue to bind
themselves by the agreement. In other words, these other contracting
parties will assuredly cooperate.
In the context of Diagram 3, Player 2 represents the contracting
parties to an international agreement which criminalizes money laun-
dering. Player 1 is the unscrupulous nation which refuses to become a
contracting party to the agreement. With full knowledge of Player 2's
cooperation, Player 1 chooses denial, its dominant strategy. Box 2
shows the outcome. Player 1 profits at the expense of Player 2. Its
financial institutions reap the profits of money laundering, the costs of
which Player 2 bears.
What causes this outcome? Cooperation generates an incentive
for some nations to cheat. Such nations see the potential for short
term profits, and know that other nations are willing to bear the
160 WEBSTER AND MCCAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 6.
161 Consent is the basis of international law. "The rules of law binding upon States ... ema-
nate from their own free will expressed in conventions or by usage generally accepted as expres-
sing principles of law." S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). See
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 24, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/127 (1969) (done
at Vienna, May 23, 1969; entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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costs. 162 In the absence of penalties for denial, some nations will re-











The section which follows argues that cooperative states ought to im-
pose penalties, through the international trade regime, on states which
refuse to criminalize money laundering.
IV. USE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE TO
COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING
A. Application of GATS and GATT to Money Laundering
Initiatives
On December 15, 1993, the contracting parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) completed the Uruguay
Round of GATr negotiations.163 These negotiations produced a new
international trade liberalization body termed the Multilateral Trade
Organization, now the World Trade Organization (WTO).' 6
162 The situation described is closely analogous to a cartel. In the case of a cartel, a group of
companies collude to fix prices and thereby ensure a certain level of profits for each member of
the cartel. However, if each firm thought that the other would keep its price fixed, each would
find it profitable to underprice the other firms. Varian, supra note 105, at 473.
163 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter MTO].
164 Id. The MTO incorporates the existing provisions of the GATT and includes new trade
liberalization agreements. States who wish to become contracting parties to the MTO must rat-
ify or otherwise accede to the agreement, which supersedes the GATT. However, contracting
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One of the most significant new agreements of the WTO is the
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). 165 The GATS
liberalizes the international services industry. Article I reads, in perti-
nent part:
1. This Agreement applies to measures by Members affecting trade in
services.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the
supply of a service;
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member;
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service of any other Member;
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence
in the territory of any other Member;
(d) by a service supplier of one Member through presence of natural
persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member.
3. For the purposes of the Agreement:
(b) "services" includes any service in any sector except services supplied
in the exercise of government authority.
166
In addition, Article II of the GATS provides most-favored nation
treatment for contracting parties to the GATS.167
Financial institutions such as banks and brokerage houses meet
the definitions of services set out in Article I of the GATS. Such sta-
tus entitles these institutions to most favored nation treatment. For
example, if the United States permits Barclays Bank, a British con-
cern (Britain is assumedly an WTO contracting party), to establish
operations in the United States, the United States must permit Deut-
scheBank, a German concern (Germany is likewise assumedly an
WTO contracting party), to establish the same type of operations in
the United States.
The GATT likewise provides most-favored nation treatment for
goods which originate from GAT contracting parties.168 Thus, if the
United States grants favorable tariff rates to goods which originate
from one GATT" contracting party, it must provide the same tariff
rates to goods which originate from all other GATT contracting
parties.
Although the GATS and the GATI strive to liberalize trade in
goods and services, the United States and its trading partners ought to
impose tariffs on the goods and services (comparative advantage
165 General Agreement on Trade and Services, December 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 45 [hereinafter
GATS].
166 Id. art. I.
167 Id. art. II.
168 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, 196-201 (entered into force on January 12, 1948) [hereinafter GATT]. See infra note 188.
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goods and services) of any country that refuses to criminalize money
laundering. Trade sanctions pursuant to Article XIV(a) of the GATS
and Article XX(a) of the GATT remedy the game theory problems
which plague international agreements on money laundering. If WTO
contracting parties which enact money laundering laws impose eco-
nomic sanctions on those nations who do not enact such laws, the lure
of lax money laundering laws disappears. The non-complying party
realizes no gain by failing to criminalize money laundering laws.
Rather, sanctions sever the umbical cord of international trade from
recalcitrant states. Profits from laundering are unlikely to compensate
for lost profits from international trade.
Take the example of Luxembourg, which is a contracting party to
the GATT, and for the sake of this example, a contracting party to the
WTO. Free trade grants Luxembourg's goods and services most-fa-
vored nation status. 69 In the context of Diagram 2, where Luxem-
bourg is Player 1 and the other contracting parties comprise Player 2,
both players cooperate. The outcome is Box 1, the Pareto efficient
outcome.
Unfortunately, while Luxembourg derives the benefits of free
trade through the world trading regime, it refuses to become a con-
tracting party to any international agreement on money laundering.'
Luxembourg's financial institutions thereby derive money laundering
profits at the expense of its trading partners which choose to criminal-
ize money laundering.
169 GAIT, supra note 168, art. I(1), T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 8, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-98; GATS,
supra note 165, art. 11(1), 33 LL.M. at 49. Article I(1) states:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports
or export, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with
respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs I and 2 of Article III, any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 168, art. I(1), T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 8,55 U.N.T.S. at 196-98. Article II(1) reads
as follows:
With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord imme-
diately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member, treat-
ment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any
other countries.
GATS, supra note 165. art. II, 33 I.L.M. at 49.
170 Luxembourg is a known money laundering haven. C. Todd Jones, Compulsion over Com-
ity: The United States' Assault on Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. IN'VL L.& Bus. 454,456 n.7
(1992).
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In response to this "cheating" problem, the United States, in con-
junction with the G-7'17 ought to invoke the public morals exception
to both the GATS172 and the GATT.173 Specifically, the G-7 should
deny favorable access to G-7 markets by the financial institutions of
nations which refuse to become contracting parties to international
money laundering agreements, or otherwise criminalize money laun-
dering practices. The denial would come in the form of increased tar-
iffs174 on the financial services 175 of offending nations. Likewise, the
G-7 ought to target strategic goods of offending nations for increased
tariff rates. On its face, such actions appear to violate the most fa-
vored nation treatment required by Article II of the GATS and Arti-
cle I of the GATr. However, the public morals exception grants
authority for such actions.
For example, Article XIV(a) permits a contracting party to the
GATS to adopt measures "necessary to protect public morals or to
maintain public order.... ,176 Footnote 5 of Article XIV provides that
"[t]he public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine
and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental in-
terests of society."'
77
171 For a discussion of the G-7, see supra text accompanying note 84.
172 GATS, supra note 165, art. XIV(a), 33 I.L.M. at 57-58. Article XIV(a) reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals....
Id.
173 GATT, supra note 168, art. XX(a), T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 56-57,55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Article
XX(a) reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals....
174 Where trade barriers are necessary, tariffs are the preferred barriers under the GATT.
GATr, supra note 168, art. XX(1). For a detailed explanation of the welfare effects of trade
barriers, See appendices A and B, infra.
175 The GATS defines financial services as follows:
A financial services is any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service supplier
of a Member [contracting party to GATS]. Financial services include all insurance and in-
surance-related services, and all banking and other financial services (excluding insurance).
GATS, supra note 165, ANNEX ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 5.1, 33 I.L.M. at 71.
The tariffs placed on financial services would be placed on all financial services of all offend-
ing nations, including those who are not contracting parties to the GATS.
176 GATS, supra note 165, art. XIV(a), 33 I.L.M. at 58.
177 GATS, supra note 165, art. XIV n.5.
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Trade sanctions against nations which permit money laundering
are "necessary to protect public morals. . .,"178 both in the context of
the GATS and the GATT. Money laundering "renders the underlying
crime lucrative, and therefore perpetuates it."' 79 In other words,
money laundering supports drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, prosti-
tution, trafficking in human body parts, and numerous other activities
in which organized crime engages. Thus fighting crime justifies invo-
cation of the public morals exception to free trade. As noted, world-
wide illicit profits approach one trillion dollars.'8 0 Nations which
permit or even encourage money laundering facilitate criminal activity
the world over. Thus, money laundering activity in Luxembourg fans
crime in the United States. The public morals exception thus protects
countries which criminalize money laundering from crime generated
by cheating nations.
Because economic theory holds that international trade increases
the wealth of nations (thus the rationale for trade liberalization agree-
ments), states which do not enact criminal money laundering laws ex-
tract benefit from international trade. However, these states likewise
benefit from the profits of money laundering. Their trading partners,
while undeniably benefiting from trade, must bear the cost of the
crime that money laundering perpetuates. The United States must
spend enormous sums of money on law enforcement efforts to com-
bat drug trafficking, prostitution, and illegal arms sales. Conse-
quently, trade with partners who refuse to criminalize money
laundering threatens the public morals of the United States.
Tariffs provide the necessary disincentive to cheat. That is, tariffs
punish nations which refuse to criminalize money laundering. In the
context of Diagram 2 (international trade), the G-7 (Player 1) chooses
denial as to those nations which refuse to criminalize money launder-
ing. If the offending nations (which comprise Player 2) choose to re-
main open to trade in the face of tariffs on their financial services and
goods, the Box 2 outcome results. Player 1 gains the optimal outcome
(free markets for their goods and services, and treasury revenue in the
form of tariffs), while Player 2 faces the worst outcome (unfavorable
market conditions for their goods and services). If Player 2 chooses to
retaliate (denial), the Box 4 outcome results. This outcome is Pareto
inefficient. The tariffs effectively penalize recalcitrant nations.
178 GATS, supra note 165, art. Xiv.
179 Smith, supra note 29, at 110.
180 Elliot, supra note 1, at 22.
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A Pareto inefficient outcome appears to penalize the G-7 nations
as well. To a certain extent, the outcome penalizes G-7 consumers of
goods and services in the form of higher prices.' 8 ' However, trade
remains free among the G-7 nations and contracting parties to the
GAIT and the GATS which criminalize money laundering. Given
that the G-7 nations provide the largest markets for the world's goods
and services, and therefore the most lucrative markets for the goods
and services of offending nations, the effect of the trade barriers are
likely to have a far greater negative impact on the offending nations
than on the G-7 nations.
The purpose of the tariffs is to penalize those nations which profit
from money laundering, that is, to ensure that profits from money
laundering are more than offset by the decrease in international trade.
Once offending nations criminalize money laundering,"' however, the
tariffs imposed ought to be eliminated. In fact, legislation which im-
poses tariffs on offending nations ought to be written so as to expire
when each offending nation criminalizes money laundering.
In addition, invocation of GATS Article XIV(a) minimizes the
adverse effects of such laws as the European Union's Capital Move-
ment Directive (CMD). Critics of the CMD charge that the directive
represents "competitive lawmaking."' 83 A competitive lawmaking re-
gime removes all barriers to trade (in the case of the CMD, all barri-
ers to capital movement), then forces the nations subject to the regime
to compete for survival after their removal. 8" Such a regime poses
two problems. First, it may provoke a race to the bottom. In the case
of free capital movement, the state which enacts the most lax banking
regulations will attract much of the capital.'8 5 Second, if one state
does attract much of the capital, the other Member States may band
together to defeat the competitive advantage of that other state. This
sort of behavior defeats the rationale of free capital movements.' 86
The current situation in the European Union supports the race to
the bottom theory. Several Member States have enacted the Money
Laundering Proposal (MLP), or are considering its enactment.8 7
181 See infra Appendix A.
182 Offending nations ought to be permitted to enact whatever statutes they deem appropriate
to criminalize money laundering. The only requirement ought to be that money laundering is no
longer tolerated by any nation. Both United States and European initiatives provide models
which offending nations should feel free to follow.
183 Smith, supra note 29, at 113.
184 Smith, supra note 29, at 113.
185 Smith, supra note 29, at 113.
186 Smith, supra note 29, at 113.




Luxembourg, however, has enacted legislation which makes its finan-
cial institutions more attractive to money laundering. This legislation,
coupled with the enactment of the MLP in other Member States, has
lead to massive inflows of capital to Luxembourg banks.
Invocation of Article XIV(a) could largely nullify this profitabil-
ity, as the above game theory analysis demonstrates. If Luxembourg's
trading partners refuse to trade in financial services with Luxembourg,
it is likely to lose more from such an embargo than it would gain from
money laundering profits. Faced with the choice of uncompetitive
goods and services in the global marketplace, Luxembourg is likely to
criminalize money laundering. Thus, Article XIV(a) may be used to
curtail the profitability of money laundering. That is, the Article may
act as a disincentive to participate in the race to the bottom.
The Treaty of Rome (Treaty) offers Member States protection
from tariffs on financial services. 188 Article 73b prohibits "all restric-
tions on the movement of capital between Member States and be-
tween Member States and third countries. . . ."189 Tariffs on the
financial services of Member States such as Luxembourg restrict capi-
tal movement among states. Tariffs on Luxembourg's financial serv-
ices increase the costs of the state's financial services. Consequently,
capital flow into Luxembourg will abate. The G-7's tariff penalties
appear to violate the treaty obligations of its European Union
members.
However, Article 73d permits Member States "to take measures
which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security."'190
The G-7 justifies its actions in regard to money laundering on the basis
of public policy. The Treaty therefore provides European Union
members of the G-7 the tools to implement G-7 policy as it relates to
the criminalization of money laundering.
B. Dispute Settlement Issues
As noted, a system of tariffs placed on the goods and services of
those nations which permit money laundering violates the most fa-
vored nation clauses of the GATS191 and the GATT 192 on its face.
The G-7 nations would treat goods and services of offending nations
188 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 7, 298
U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
189 Id. art. 73b.
190 Id. art. 73d.
191 GATS, supra note 165, art. II, 33 I.L.M. at 49.
192 GATT, supra note 168, art. I, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 8-13, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-201.
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less favorably than goods and services of other contracting parties (as-
suming the offending nations were contracting parties to the GATT
and GATS (WTO)). The G-7, of course, justifies the tariff regime on
the basis of the public moral exceptions of the two relevant
agreements.
Nations subject to the tariffs, however, would likely bring a com-
plaint before the WTO.193 First, pursuant to the original GATT
agreements, the nations subject to tariffs could demand consultations
with the G-7.194 Thus the G-7 must consider the complaints of the
offending nations as to the tariffs imposed upon them. Moreover, the
offending nations may propose a compromise or other resolution to
the tariff/money laundering dispute, to which the G-7 must give sym-
pathetic consideration. 195 If the adverse parties are unable to come to
an agreement, the offending nations may request that other con-
tracting parties to the GATT investigate the matter (because these
dispute mechanisms arise under the auspices of the GATT, the offend-
ing nations may raise their concerns only to goods which have been
impaired by tariffs). 196
Articles XXII and XXIII force the G-7 to consider the offending
nations complaints. In addition, the G-7 might face an investigation
193 The MTO of December 15,1993 provides and international regime to administer all trade
agreements among its Members. MTO, supra note 163, art. II, 33 I.L.M. at 15.
The MTO aids in dispute negotiations among Members and administers the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding. MTO, supra note 163, art. 111(3).
194 GATT, supra note 168, art. XXII, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 60, U.N.T.S. at 266. Article XXII
provides:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford ade-
quate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by an-
other contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with
any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to
find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
195 GATT, supra note 168, art. XXIII (1). Article XXIII(1) reads:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective
of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligation under this Agree-
ment, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it con-
flicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the
other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party
thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals
made to it.
196 GATT, supra note 168, art. XXIII(2).
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by the contracting parties to the GATT, the recommendations'
97 of
which may be adverse to the G-7. However, the offending nations
may propose a compromise solution which restores free trade and
criminalizes money laundering. In any event, the actions of the G-7
bring offending nations to the negotiating table. In the interim, the
tariffs remain in place as a penalty until the parties reach a solution.
Such a penalty increases the likelihood that offending nations will
eventually capitulate.
Disputes over financial services fall under the auspices of the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (DSU).'98 The DSU affirms the dis-
pute settlement mechanisms of GATT, Articles XXII and XXIII. 199
The DSU also provides that
[b]efore bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to
whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the
dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dis-
pute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and con-
sistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred [emphasis
added]." °
The offending nations, therefore, may bring a complaint before
the DSU in order to have the tariffs on its services (and goods) re-
moved. Importantly, if these nations successfully demonstrate that
the G-7 wrongfully erected tariff barriers on their goods and services,
the DSU permits compensation and suspension of concessions
(though in limited circumstances) at the request of the nations if the
G-7 were to refuse to remove the tariffs.2 0'
Once again, however, the G-7 forces nations which refuse to
criminalize money laundering (and are WTO contracting parties) to
the bargaining table. The dispute settlement process is not instantane-
ous. As the proceedings linger, the goods and services of the offend-
ing nations continue to face G-7 tariffs. The financial institutions of
these nations continue to lose profits. Inertia, therefore, increases the
197 Article XXIII(2) permits the contracting parties to the GAIT to investigate a concern
brought to its attention, and permits recommendations as a result of those investigations.
GATr, supra note 168, art. XXIII(2).
198 The Dispute Settlement Understanding [hereinafter "DSU"] "shall... apply to consulta-
tions and the settlement of disputes between Members concerning their rights and obligations
under the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization
(MTO) .. " Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
GATE Doc. MTN/FIA 11-A2, Dec. 15, 1993, [hereinafter DSU], art.1.1.
199 Id. art. 3.1.
200 Id. art. 3.7.
201 Id. art. 22.1
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probability of a mutually acceptable agreement on money laundering
criminalization and with it the removable of painful trade barriers.
In summary, though the dispute settlement mechanisms of the
world trade regime might well determine that tariff barriers imposed
upon nations which refuse to criminalize money laundering violate G-
7 trade obligations, the very same mechanisms will likely force a mu-
tually acceptable solution to the money laundering problem.
Arguably, international law protects the G-7's imposition of tar-
iffs on recalcitrant states. The Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Restatement) holds that a rule of
international law may derive from international agreement.20 2 Thus
international agreements which criminalize money laundering may es-
tablish a rule of international law. As noted above, a majority of
states are contracting parties to the Drug Convention, an international
agreement. 20 3 In addition, the G-7, the world's most powerful group
of industrialized nations, now agrees to criminalize money laundering
(for purposes of this argument). Thus the G-7 enters into an interna-
tional agreement.
Section 102(3) of the Restatement asserts that international
agreements intended for states' general adherence, and which are
widely accepted lead to the creation of customary international law.
204
In this instance, the Drug Convention is intended for states' general
adherence. The G-7's tariffs on nations which refuse to criminalize
money laundering support the notion of general adherence. More-
over, because a majority of states are contracting parties to the Drug
Convention, a majority of states indicate a belief that money launder-
ing constitutes criminal behavior. Therefore, states widely accept the
202 Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States section
102(1)(b) [hereinafter Restatement]. § 102 reads:
Sources of International Law
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international
community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(b) by international agreement; or
(c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the
world.
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the
creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence
by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.
(4) General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or re-
flected or reflected in customary law or international agreement, may be invoked as supple-
mentary rules of international law where appropriate.
203 Drug Convention, supra note 69, at 493.
204 Restatement, supra note 202.
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notion of money laundering as criminal conduct. These agreements
thus form a rule of international law which criminalizes money laun-
dering and provides for penalties for those states which choose to
break the rule.
States which ignore the rule of international law necessarily vio-
late international law. G-7 tariffs are therefore an attempt to enforce
principles of international law, a concept consistent with the principles
of GATT and GATS.
V. CONCLUSION
Money laundering perpetuates organized crime. To effectively
combat crime, nations must combat money laundering. International
efforts to criminalize money laundering are a logical genesis. How-
ever, such efforts provide an incentive for unscrupulous nations to
permit money laundering by their financial institutions in order to
gain an economic advantage for their citizens.
Trade sanctions present an effective means of dismantling the
profit incentive that laundering provides. Although such sanctions
seem to contradict the underlying purposes for which the GATT and
the GATS were enacted, namely to bolster free trade, this course of
action ensures the integrity of the world's financial system. Integrity
in turn ensures that legitimate business profits can move freely
throughout the international financial system. Finally, trade sanctions
force trade among partners on an equal basis; one partner will not
have to bear a disproportionate share of the law enforcement costs
related to money laundering and underlying crime.
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APPENDIX A
WELFARE EFFECTS OF TARIFFS
P S
Pw+t
Pw a b c d tariff
Q1 Q3 Q4Q2 Q
The above graph illustrates the welfare effects of a tariff. The
point where the supply and demand curves meet establishes the do-
mestic price for the good at issue. As the graph demonstrates, the
world price, Pw, is substantially below the domestic price of the good.
At P,, domestic producers of the good produce only Q, of the
total amount of the good demanded by domestic consumers, Q2. Con-
sequently, at the world price, domestic consumers would require Q2-
Q1 of the good in the form of imports.
If the domestic government, in an attempt to protect producers of
the good, levies a tariff on the good, the domestic price rises to P,,,.
The amount of the tariff is the distance from Pw to Pwt As a result of
the tariff, domestic producers of the good manufacture Q3, an increase
over Q1. Domestic consumers demand Q4, a decrease from Q2. The
new quantity of the good imported is Q4-Q3.
The tariff redistribute resources. Producers of the good gain be-
cause of increased production and higher prices, represented by the
area "a" in the graph (producer surplus). The government gains tariff
revenue, represented by the area "c" in the graph.
Consumers, however, are the victims of the tariff. They lose an
area, represented by "-(a+b+c+d)" in the graph. Consumer surplus
decreases. This decrease results from the higher prices consumers are
forced to pay because of the tariff. As the graph illustrates, consumers




Q4 as opposed to Q2. The following table shows the results of the
tariff.
Welfare Costs of a Tariff
Change in Consumer Surplus -a-b-c-d
Change in Producer Surplus +a
Change in Government Revenue +c
Net Welfare Change -b-d
The table shows that a tariff results in a net welfare loss to soci-
ety. Although the government and producers gain, "-b-d" represent
the deadweight costs to society of a tariff. Deadweight costs result
from resources devoted to expanded consumption of the goods. That
is, consumers spend more now on this particular good; consequently,
they have fewer dollars to spend on other goods (and services). More-
over, the tariff may force consumers to spend their scarce resources on
less desirable substitutes for the good.2"5
APPENDIX B
WELFARE EFFECTS OF QUOTAS
205 See Husted, supra note 130, at 162-63.
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This graph illustrates the welfare effects of a quota. 0 6 In this
case, rather than raising the price through a tariff, the government
limits the amount of a good which may be imported into a country.
Domestic producers of the good, in order to meet demand, increase
production at a higher price. Because the number of goods which may
enter the country is limited, the supply curve shifts to the right from
Sm to Sm+quota (a shortage of the good exists because the government
artificially limits the amount of goods available from cheaper foreign
sources.) Consequently, the domestic producer demands a higher
price for its production of the good for all levels of demand.
Pa is the autarky price - the price at which domestic supply and
demand for the good would be in equilibrium absent trade. Pw is the
world price, and Pq is the price which results in the domestic economy
as a result of the tariff.
Once again, consumer suffer the effects of protection. They again
lose money equal to "-(a+b+c+d)." Producers gain. Producer surplus
in this case equals area "a." However, the government may not gain
any revenue. This time, the government imposes no tariff, so area "c"
does not necessarily represent government revenue. Only if the gov-
ernment chooses to auction off the right to import the quota amount
of the good will it receive revenue, called quota rents. In the case of
the United States, the government rarely chooses to auction off quota
rights. Rather, it simply grants a particular organization a license to
import. Consequently, society loses area "c" as well. The following
table illustrates the welfare effects of a quota.
Welfare Effects of a Quota
Change in Consumer Surplus -a-b-c-d
Change in Producer Surplus +a
Change in Government Revenue 0
Net Welfare Change -b-c-d
This table demonstrates that quotas produce negative welfare ef-
fects on society. In fact, consumers lose the area "-(b+c+d)", which is
comprised of deadweight costs to society and a loss of government
revenue, when the government chooses not to auction quota import
rights. Therefore, quotas produce greater negative welfare impacts
206 Quotas are "government imposed limits on the quantity or valued of goods traded be-
tween countries." Husted, supra note 130, at 189. This graph illustrates a limit on the quantity
of a good traded between countries.
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than tariffs produce. 207 The economics of quotas explain GATT's
preference for tariffs where trade barriers are necessary.
207 See Husted, supra note 130, at 191.
